

Microeconomic Modeling of Incentives for Managed Overlays

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
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An ISP Market for Managed Overlays

- Application-Layer Overlays are increasingly important in the provisioning of high QoS service
 - Akamai
 - Limelight
 - KonTiki
 - Skype
 - BitTorrent
 - etc...



http://www.akamai.com/html/technology/dataviz1.html


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


An ISP Market for Managed Overlays

- *IP Multihoming* is particularly attractive for end nodes of these kinds of services
- There is a trend towards usagebased billing
- Can we model a market where overlays dynamically allocate loads among ISPs on the basis of edge-to-edge instantaneous pricing?








We focus on ISPs that provide access links, as opposed to transit operators

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


Edge Service Providers (ESPs) deploy managed nodes at the network edge

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


Content can be **generated** anywhere at the network access

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


Content can be **consumed** anywhere at the network access

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




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




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




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




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
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





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













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


- Increasing utility with increasing traffic exchange between any two sites
 - Simplest case: replicating all traffic at every site
 - Cost limitations prevent this






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
- Increasing utility with increasing quality on exchanges between any two sites
 - Overlay links will be annotated with some notion of quality q_{ski}
 - Transferring a given amount of traffic between two sites yields greater utility if the quality of the overlay link between them increases



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
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
- ESPs pay an increasing cost with increasing traffic volume exchanged between any two overlay sites
- We assumine a simple pay-per-volume model



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
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


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 Diminishing marginal utility on the amount of resources provided by a single site







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 Diminishing marginal utility on the quality that a given site is able to provide







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 Diminishing marginal utility on the number of sites that supply a site with resources







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 Diminishing marginal utility on the number of sites that supply a site with resources







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
 Diminishing marginal utility on the number of sites that supply a site with resources









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
• We propose an extremely simple, quasilinear utility function for each site that has all these properties:



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• We propose an extremely simple, quasilinear utility function for each site that has all these properties:





• We thus formulate the following optimisation problem:

Sum of over
all sites *i*
Maximise:
$$U = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{N}} U_i$$

 $U = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \left(\beta_i \left(\sum_{k \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \mathcal{I}} b_{ski}^{\alpha_i} q_{ski}^{\gamma_i} \right)^{\delta_i} - \sum_{k \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \mathcal{I}} p_{ski} b_{ski} \right)$

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Microeconomic Modeling of Incentives for Managed Overlays



• The unconstrained solution to this problem is:

$$b_{sji} = \arg \max U \begin{pmatrix} \frac{q_{sji}}{p_{sji}} \end{pmatrix}^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}} \\ b_{sji} = (\beta_i \alpha_i \delta_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i \delta_i}} \frac{\left(\sum_{k \in \mathsf{N}, t \in \mathcal{I}} p_{tki} \left(\frac{q_{tki}}{p_{tki}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}}\right)^{\frac{1-\delta_i}{1-\alpha_i \delta_i}}}$$

- Not unexpectedly, b_{sji} is a function of:
 - the utility parameters $lpha_i, eta_i, \delta_i, \gamma_i$
 - the overlay link prices p_{tki}
 - the overlay cost-benefit ratios $\frac{q_{tki}^{\gamma_i}}{p_{tki}}$

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 We can extend this solution by considering a *budget constraint*:

Maximise:
$$U = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{N}} U_i$$
$$U = \sum_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \left(\beta_i \left(\sum_{k \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \mathcal{I}} b_{ski}^{\alpha_i} q_{ski}^{\gamma_i} \right)^{\delta_i} - \sum_{k \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \mathcal{I}} p_{ski} b_{ski} \right)$$
Subject to:
$$\sum_{\substack{i \in \mathbb{N}, k \in \mathbb{N}, t \in \mathcal{I} \\ \vdots \\ \text{Subject to: sum over all origin/destination site pairs and over all ISPs}} \mathcal{B}$$

Microeconomic Modeling of Incentives for Managed Overlays



• The constrained solution to this problem is:

$$b_{sji} = (\beta_i \alpha_i \delta_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i \delta_i}} \left(\frac{1}{1+\lambda}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}} \frac{\left(\frac{q_{sji}^{\gamma_i}}{p_{sji}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}}}{\left(\sum_{k \in \mathsf{N}, t \in \mathcal{I}} p_{tki} \left(\frac{q_{tki}^{\gamma_i}}{p_{tki}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}}\right)^{\frac{1-\delta_i}{1-\alpha_i \delta_i}}}$$

- Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. Of course, this simplifies to the unbounded case if $\lambda = 0$ (constraint does not bind).
- To find λ , we define \hat{B}_i , the total flow cost for site *i* had the budget condition not been binding:

$$\hat{\mathcal{B}}_i = \sum_{k \in \mathsf{N}, s \in \mathcal{I}} p_{ski} \hat{b}_{ski}$$



- Then, λ can be found by solving the following equation:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathsf{N}} \left(\frac{1}{1+\lambda} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha_i}} \hat{\mathcal{B}}_i = \mathcal{B}$$


- Simple procedure for constrained problem:
- Calculate traffic matrix ignoring binding constraint
- Calculate $\hat{\mathcal{B}}_i$ using this traffic matrix
- If $\mathcal{B} \geq \sum_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \hat{\mathcal{B}}_i$, the budget condition does not bind and $\lambda = 0$
- Else, find λ and obtain correct traffic matrix b_{sji}

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Modeling Overlay Preferences (Example)


 Consider two overlay sites, *i* and *j*, that can reach each other through two given ISPs



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
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- Consider two overlay sites, *i* and *j*, that can reach each other through two given ISPs
- We analyse the allocation of flow volumes to ISPs, the total cost and the total utility as the price p_{1ji} changes.




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
Total ESP Cost



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Total ESP Utility



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Fitting Aggregate Overlay Preferences

- To be used in practice, the model presented requires the estimation of $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i$ and both q_{ski} and p_{ski} .
- Furthermore, it may be of interest for a given ISP to model the *demand aggregate* provided by all of its ESPs, rather than the preferences of each single ESP
- The obvious data-driven approach for this is through regression. If we denote the flow volume of origin-destination site pair k with B_k , we seek an approximate such that $B_k = f(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k, \dots) \quad \forall k$



Fitting Overlay Preferences

 We propose to use the well known Cobb-Douglas function for this demand model:

$$\log B_k = \eta_0^k + \sum_{\xi \in \mathsf{L}} \eta_\xi^k \log p_\xi$$

- Thus, we explicitly model the price elasticity of demand η_k^k and the cross elasticity of demand η_ξ^k :

$$\frac{\partial \log B_k}{\partial \log p_{\xi}} = \eta_{\xi}^k$$

• This allows the modeling of *flow substitution* effects

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Fitting Overlay Preferences

Range	Category	Responsiveness	Change in demand for k given that ξ increases in price
$\eta^k_{\xi} \to -\infty$	Complement	Perfectly Elastic	Arbitrary Decrease
$-\infty < \eta_{\xi}^k < -1$	Complement	Elastic	Large Decrease
$\eta_{\xi}^{k} = -1$	Complement	Unitary Elastic	Comparable Decrease
$-1 < \eta_{\xi}^k < 0$	Complement	Inelastic	Small Decrease
$\eta^k_{\xi} = 0$	Independent	Perfectly Inelastic	No Change
$0 < \eta_{\xi}^k < 1$	Substitute	Inelastic	Small Increase
$\eta^k_\xi = 1$	Substitute	Unitary Elastic	Comparable Increase
$1 < \eta_{\xi}^k < \infty$	Substitute	Elastic	Large Increase
$\eta^k_\xi \to \infty$	Substitute	Perfectly Elastic	Arbitrary Increase

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


Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure

- Fitting is performed through conventional least-squares regression
- To test the model:
 - Assume single underlying ISP and 15 overlay sites
 - A set of 15 ESPs is created, along with a vector of IID parameters ($\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i, \delta_i$) for each one.
 - An overlay link quality matrix q_{jk} is generated
 - 400 price vectors are generated, and the response from the aggregate overlay estimated through regression
 - 600 additional price vectors are tested without further update to estimated elasticities



Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure



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Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure

 Estimation has good 0.9 relative squared error performance 0.8 0.7 0.6 CDF 0.5 $|\hat{B}\rangle$ 0.4 |2| E_{rel} 0.3 12 0.2 0.1 00 2 6 4 **Squared Error** x 10⁻³


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Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure

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Estimated Cross-Elasticity of Demand Matrix




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Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure

Estimated Cross-Elasticity of Demand Matrix


- Cross-elasticites of demand are either
- zero flows are perfectly inelastic, independent products
- positive flows are inelastic, substitute products
- This happens because quality between flows is uncorrelated



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
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Testing the Overlay Preference Fitting Procedure



 η_k^0

 $-\infty < \eta_k^k < -1$



Gives indication for demand at unit price

Flow demand is elastic with price

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Future Work

- How close to reality are these models?
 - We need data
- In the monopoly case, and ISP can estimate aggregate demand and choose a site-to-site price equal to its site-tosite cost (see my PhD thesis)
- For the oligopoly case:
 - Characterise equilibria for a given solution concept
 - How quickly can the system converge to these?
 - How stable are these?



Thank You!

Questions?

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