On simple routing games Modelling Interdomain routing with game theory

Dr Yann Golanski

Department of Mathematics Networks and Nonlinear Dynamics Group University of York

Mathematics of Networks 3rd Meeting 20 December 2004

Outline



Fundations

- Interdomain routing
- Stable Path Problem
- Game theory

Outline



- Interdomain routing
- Stable Path Problem
- Game theory
- Simple routing games
 - Simple routing games
 - A two node network
 - Another two node network

Outline



- Interdomain routing
- Stable Path Problem
- Game theory
- Simple routing games
 - Simple routing games
 - A two node network
 - Another two node network
- 3 Bayesian games
 - What are the rules again?
 - Bayesian routing game
 - Winning strategies!

Outline



- Interdomain routing
- Stable Path Problem
- Game theory
- Simple routing games
 - Simple routing games
 - A two node network
 - Another two node network
- 3 Bayesian games
 - What are the rules again?
 - Bayesian routing game
 - Winning strategies!
 - Conclusions

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?

Answered Question Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?

Answered Question Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

AS can define its own routing policies.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?

Answered Question Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

- AS can define its own routing policies.
- AS can be made of many computers, sites and domains.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?

Answered Question

Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

- AS can define its own routing policies.
- AS can be made of many computers, sites and domains.
- AS are not bound to one country.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?

Answered Question

Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

- AS can define its own routing policies.
- AS can be made of many computers, sites and domains.
- AS are not bound to one country.
- Very large growth from 900 (1995) to 15,000 (2002). A better indicator is the active BGP entries: 20,000 (Jan 1995) to 180,000 (Jan 2005).

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is Interdomain routing?


Answered Question

Interdomain routing is the routing between zones of administrative control known as Autonomous Systems (ASes).

- AS can define its own routing policies.
- AS can be made of many computers, sites and domains.
- AS are not bound to one country.
- Very large growth from 900 (1995) to 15,000 (2002). A better indicator is the active BGP entries: 20,000 (Jan 1995) to 180,000 (Jan 2005).
- ASes communicate over the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

How does the AS graph look like?



©2003 UC Regents: CAIDA

Dr Yann Golanski

On simple routing games


Fundations

Simple routing games Bayesian games Conclusions

Dr Yann Golanski

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

BGP growth



©http://bgp.potaroo.net/

On simple routing games

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

Stable Path Problem

Griffin & Wilfong proposed a *general stable path problem* (SPP) as a model for BGP interactions.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

Stable Path Problem

Griffin & Wilfong proposed a *general stable path problem* (SPP) as a model for BGP interactions.

Informally, the stable path problem is a routing problem on an undirected graph with all nodes trying to reach a single destination '0'. Each node has a ranked list of preferred paths to '0'. A solution to the stable path problem is a set of paths, one for each node, where each node is assigned the highest ranked path which does not conflict with paths chosen by other nodes.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is game theory?

Answered Question *Game theory* is a mathematical analysis of conflict between parties called players.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is game theory?

Answered Question *Game theory* is a mathematical analysis of conflict between parties called players.

All players are rational and intelligent.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is game theory?

Answered Question *Game theory* is a mathematical analysis of conflict between parties called players.

- All players are rational and intelligent.
- All players try to maximise a payoff function.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is game theory?

Answered Question

Game theory is a mathematical analysis of conflict between parties called players.

- All players are rational and intelligent.
- All players try to maximise a *payoff function*.
- If all players know all there is to know about the game and other players (i.e. rules, strategies, number of players...) then the game is said to be of complete information.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

What is game theory?

Answered Question

Game theory is a mathematical analysis of conflict between parties called players.

- All players are rational and intelligent.
- All players try to maximise a *payoff function*.
- If all players know all there is to know about the game and other players (i.e. rules, strategies, number of players...) then the game is said to be of complete information.
- If the above is not true, the game is called Bayesian.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

Nash Equilibria

Definition

A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if no player could increase his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from the prediction of the randomised strategy profile.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

Nash Equilibria

Definition

A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if no player could increase his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from the prediction of the randomised strategy profile.

• A Nash equilibria always exist in mixed strategies.

Interdomain routing Stable Path Problem Game theory

Nash Equilibria

Definition

A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if no player could increase his expected payoff by unilaterally deviating from the prediction of the randomised strategy profile.

- A Nash equilibria always exist in mixed strategies.
- Sometimes, the Nash equilibrium results in the worst possible payoffs as in the *Prisoners' dilemma*.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Simple routing games

Definition A simple routing game follows

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Simple routing games

Definition

A simple routing game follows

Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Simple routing games

Definition

A simple routing game follows

- Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.
- 2 A strategy for a player is to choose a certain path in the set of ranked permitted paths.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Simple routing games

Definition

A simple routing game follows

- Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.
- 2 A strategy for a player is to choose a certain path in the set of ranked permitted paths.
- The payoff function depends on rank of the path (strategy) chosen and the ability to successfully route to AS 0.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Simple routing games

Definition

A simple routing game follows

- Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.
- 2 A strategy for a player is to choose a certain path in the set of ranked permitted paths.
- The payoff function depends on rank of the path (strategy) chosen and the ability to successfully route to AS 0.
- ⁴ The game is of full information such that all players know the rules of the game, their payoffs and the set of strategies of all other players. If the game is played multiple times, all the players know all the past moves of all the players.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!

The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!

The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

This should be obvious but is nonetheless very nice.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!

The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

This should be obvious but is nonetheless very nice. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibria in pure strategy exists.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!

The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

This should be obvious but is nonetheless very nice. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibria in pure strategy exists. Hence SPP can be unstable.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!

The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

This should be obvious but is nonetheless very nice. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibria in pure strategy exists. Hence SPP can be unstable. Hence BGP can be unstable.

Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A good news!


The Nash equilibria in pure strategy correspond to a solution of the stable path problem.

This should be obvious but is nonetheless very nice. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibria in pure strategy exists. Hence SPP can be unstable. Hence BGP can be unstable.

Note that this argument is really the inverse of the proper one: BGP has been shown to be unstable, hence all model of BGP must show the potential to be unstable...


Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

A simple routing game



Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network


A simple routing game



	AS 2	
AS 1	first	second
first	2,2	-2 , -2
second	1,2	1, 1


Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Another simple routing game



Simple routing games A two node network Another two node network

Another simple routing game



	AS	52
AS 1	first	second
first	-2, -2	2,1
second	1,2	1, 1

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Some information is missing

Sometimes, a players (AS) will not know some information about the game: namely what the strategies of at least one other player are.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Some information is missing

Sometimes, a players (AS) will not know some information about the game: namely what the strategies of at least one other player are. This would model an AS not knowing what the routing policies of another AS are...

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Some information is missing

Sometimes, a players (AS) will not know some information about the game: namely what the strategies of at least one other player are. This would model an AS not knowing what the routing policies of another AS are... as is the case in real life!

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Some information is missing

Sometimes, a players (AS) will not know some information about the game: namely what the strategies of at least one other player are. This would model an AS not knowing what the routing policies of another AS are... as is the case in real life! Enter *Baysian games...*

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Baysian routing games

Definition

A Bayesian routing game follows

- Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.
- 2 A strategy for a player is to choose a certain path in the set of ranked permitted paths.
- The payoff function depends on rank of the path (strategy) chosen and the ability to successfully route to AS 0.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Baysian routing games


Definition

A Bayesian routing game follows

- Each player is an AS node trying to route to node 0 called the destination.
- 2 A strategy for a player is to choose a certain path in the set of ranked permitted paths.
- The payoff function depends on rank of the path (strategy) chosen and the ability to successfully route to AS 0.
- 4 All players know the rules of the game, their payoffs but not the full set of strategies of some other players. If the game is played multiple times, all the players know all the past moves of all the players.


What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

A Bayesian routing game



What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

A Bayesian routing game



		AS 2		
lpha			eta	
first	second	· -	first	second
2,2	-2, -2		−2 , −2	2, 1
1,2	1,1		1,2	1,1
	first 2,2	first second 2,2 -2,-2		$\begin{array}{c c} \alpha \\ \hline \text{first} & \text{second} \\ \hline 2,2 & -2,-2 \\ \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \beta \\ \hline -2,-2 \\ \end{array}$

Dr Yann Golanski

On simple routing games

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Reinforced learning

Reinforced learning is a strategy that allow the players to learn how to map situations to actions such that the reward is maximised. Actions might not only influence the immediate reward but also the next situation and therefore subsequent rewards.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Reinforced learning

Reinforced learning is a strategy that allow the players to learn how to map situations to actions such that the reward is maximised. Actions might not only influence the immediate reward but also the next situation and therefore subsequent rewards.

A classical example is the *n*-armed bandit, a slot machine with *n* levers.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

Fictitious play

A *fictitious play* strategy is a process by which players assume that the strategies of their opponents are randomly chosen from some unknown stationary distribution. In each period, a player selects his best response to the historical frequency of actions of his opponents.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

How about cooperations?...

Would cooperative game theory help?

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

How about cooperations?...

Would cooperative game theory help? The short answer is no: ASes are generally competing companies.

What are the rules again? Bayesian routing game Winning strategies!

How about cooperations?...

Would cooperative game theory help? The short answer is no: ASes are generally competing companies. The real answer is maybe: Some ASes do enter into trade agreements. So, it is possible for some AS to cooperate with some of its neighbours and not with others.

... and finally

This is the end!

This work was funded by Nortel Networks and is currently used as a foundation work for an EPSRC proposal.

Thank you very much for your attention.

These slides are available on *http://gridlock.york.ac.uk/staff/yann* in both PDF and metapost with LATEX. This presentation was done using *Latex Beamer* and LATEX.