A sybilproof indirect reciprocity mechanism for peer-to-peer networks

Submitted by richard on Mon, 11/30/2009 - 00:00
Raul Landa, Richard G. Clegg, Eleni Mykoniati, David Griffin and Miguel Rio
Proceedings of INFOCOM p. 343-351
Although direct reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat) contribution
systems have been successful in reducing freeloading in peerto-
peer overlays, it has been shown that, unless the contribution
network is dense, they tend to be slow (or may even fail) to
converge [1]. On the other hand, current indirect reciprocity
mechanisms based on reputation systems tend to be susceptible
to Sybil attacks, peer slander and whitewashing.
In this paper, we present an accounting mechanism for peer
contributions that is based on social capital. This mechanism
allows peers to contribute resources to one set of peers and
use this contribution to obtain services from a different set of
peers, at a different time. Our proposed technique is completely
decentralised, it can be implemented in both structured and
unstructured peer-to-peer systems, and it is resistant to the three
kinds of attacks mentioned above.
To achieve this, we model contribution transitivity as a routing
problem in the contribution network of the peer-to-peer overlay,
and we present arguments for the routing behaviour and the
sybilproofness of our contribution transfer procedures on this
basis. Additionally, we present mechanisms for the seeding
of the contribution network, and a combination of incentive
mechanisms and reciprocation policies that motivate peers to
adhere to the protocol and maximise their service contributions
to the overlay.
author={Landa, R. and Griffin, D. and Clegg, R. and Mykoniati, E. and Rio, M.},
booktitle={Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM},
title={A Sybilproof Indirect Reciprocity Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer Networks},
Paper type